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War Cost
Analysis The America that I have known will one day be
remembered for its military achievements, especially for how effectively we
managed costs to ourselves. World War II was, in many respects, the
greatest and most costly in world history.
America entered late, suffered over 400,000 fatalities, spent almost
40% of its gross product for three years, and emerged one of the
victors. We were then able to nourish
the recovery of many other combatants, both allies and enemies. Because we entered the war from depressed
economic conditions, much of the economic cost was absorbed by the full
employment of recently-idle labor and industrial capacities. A decade later, America again was at war, in
Korea. That cost us nearly 40,000
lives, and at the peak, 13% of our gross product. It prevented a totalitarian conquest of
South Korea, a nation now free, friendly and prosperous. In Vietnam, after expending over 50,000 lives
and product at a rate that approached 10%, we withdrew. That choice was a political one, not a
military defeat. There, the subsequent
cost in lives to our former allies was more horrendous than anything that we
ourselves have suffered. The high cost
to America’s political unity and social order is still evident. For most of the last half of the twentieth
century we were engaged in a cold war with the Soviet Union. Except that the wars in both Korea and
Vietnam were related to our contest with the Soviets, the cold war was nearly
fatality free. It did, however,
require us to maintain high military outlays.
We prospered in spite of those expenditures; the Soviets were unable
to keep pace and their system collapsed. Now, we are at war with radical
Islamists. They declared it; they
attacked us at home; they vow to destroy us.
Our military costs, in lives and in treasure, are moderate when compared
to those during most of my lifetime.
Our response remains incomplete. |
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The graph to the right , by the Office of Management and Budget, demonstrates that in
the 1990’s a very large part of the Clinton Administration’s savings came
from national defense. Those savings
have made the war in Iraq more expensive than it might have been had an
earlier level of military, and intelligence, spending been maintained. If you look at similar graphs for the period
of the Vietnam War, you will find that, at it’s most expensive around Tet,
1968, military spending rose only slightly above the previous decade of Cold
War spending. Much of national defense costs are for maintaining,
training, and improving the readiness capabilities of our forces, whether at
home in peace or abroad in some limited conflict. Especially, in the earlier battles of WWII
we paid in extra lives for our lack of readiness. The old saying that, “if you want peace,
you should prepare for war” has merit.
The Swiss and Swedes have done well at it, but only recently. During WWII our Navy relied heavily upon
the 20mm and 40mm machineguns of Swiss Oilercon and Swedish Bofors armament
companies. Both the Swiss and Swedes had violent
histories in earlier centuries; both maintained high states of preparedness;
and both avoided active involvement in WWII.
The United States is far too large a player in
the world to expect such easy choices. |
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And the WALL STREET
JOURNAL |
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Page 6 |
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WARS AND THEIR
COSTS The following articles discuss the impact of media disinformation as it
relates to our involvement in the use of the military. |
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Admiral Fallon, History
Repeats Itself The recent retirement of Admiral Fallon from Central Command,
apparently over disagreement with the Administration’s policy, is entirely
consistent with the American tradition that the military serves under
civilian leadership in pursuing matters of national interest and
strategy. It was the essential basis
of President Truman’s firing of General MacArthur. Unfortunately, that principle is not as
clear or simple as it sounds. Our Vietnam experience should have helped us to clarify such
matter; it only demonstrated for future enemies our greatest
vulnerability. Shortly after that
war, I had a brief exchange with
Colonel Harry Summers on that matter. CLEARER NATIONAL POLICY NEEDED column, The Morning Sun, 10/19/83 by Ivan Parkins “On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,” by Col.
Harry G. Summers Jr. is used as a text at the Army War College and in other
officer training programs. It is a
sober piece of military scholarship, built around the thesis that strategy
begins with a clear and attainable military objective and that such an
objective must be derived from national policy. Col. Summers regards
the making of national policy as civilian function. He contends that in Vietnam our national
policy was unclear and so was our military objective. What Col. Summers
calls for is consistent with both classical military theory and the American
constitutional system. Our Army’s
leaders should consult with civilian makers of national policy and recommend
strategies. It is up to Army
leadership to say what objectives the Army is capable of attaining and at
what probable cost. “Nation Building,” as
in Vietnam, does not qualify as a clear and attainable military objective. Lyndon Johnson bears
the brunt of Col. Summers’ criticism-for our uncertain policy, especially for
not invoking the will of the American people in support of the Vietnam
effort. Apparently, Col. Summers
believes that a formal declaration of war would have forestalled most of our
problems there. The chief weakness of
both the book and our actual strategy in Vietnam is one imposed by our
constitutional tradition. Our military
leaders are obliged to accept policies which the American political system,
especially the President, define for them. Is the American
political system capable of doing what it failed to do in Vietnam; can it
actually choose and maintain, a clear policy?
It is easy to sympathize with Col. Summers’ view that, in Vietnam, the
Army was let down by its commander in chief. However, I doubt that military demands for
a more clearly defined policy, as a basis for strategy, could have
contributed much more to American success in Vietnam. What Army demands for clearer national policies, might have
been achieved during the Vietnam War,
and they may yet achieve in the future.
They may sharpen constitutional conflict at home. And a domestic showdown over how American
policy is made and sustained, may be overdue. On one hand, after
noting that the mass media were a source of much embarrassment to efforts of
our military in Vietnam, Col. Summers says (p39), “censorship is not the
answer.” He then observes that it is
difficult to reconcile the realities of the battlefield with American
idealism. On the other hand,
Col. Summers concurs in the traditional theory that national will is a vital
constituent of national strength. How
can America be strong if its media does not help to rationalize its policies,
i.e. to relate its ideals to realities of this world? The central fact of
American politics and policy regarding Vietnam was that an influential
minority of Americans set out (most of them not until after the nation was
committed) to discredit and disrupt our war effort. They included many leading academics and
journalists, and their views dominated the national media. Confusion regarding
the nature of our involvement did not originate in the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution. As Sen. Fulbright
acknowledged, in answer to Sen. Cooper during debate, that document
authorized the president to lead us into war.
Only two Senators, and no Representative, voted against it. We were defeated in
Vietnam, because we lacked a clear policy and the national will to
pursue it. We lacked these because so
many of the instruments of opinion formation, especially our institutions of
higher education and mass communication, were employed, not to help clarify
policy and strengthen will, but to destroy them both. The increased size,
autonomy and influence of higher education and mass communication constitute
the most fundamental change in the American political system during this
century. Neither our constitutional
tradition nor Col. Summers book explains how change of such magnitude can be
accommodated. So far, the
presidency of the United States has been the principal bulwark of traditional
and popular leadership. Congress, when
blitzed by the media, has shown little sense of its responsibility to either
the most recent election results or to its own previous commitments. Of that, Vietnam remains a prime example. Much as Col. Summers
and the Army may wish to accept the American tradition and to ask only what
policies they should help execute, they cannot really avoid the growing
dilemma of American politics. Indeed, the Army must
ask the political system for a clear statement of policy before it
fights. But, should it ask only the
president, or the president and Congress, or must it now consult the mass
media, too? If a prompt and
substantial agreement among all of those is not forthcoming, or if, as in
Vietnam, the agreement collapses, should our Army fight? Now, one point has been made clear by the terrorists; they mean
to destroy us. Avoiding a fight is not one of our
options. The remaining issues are
reduced to when, where, and by what means.
Our military is adapting well to enemy challenges. Our political system is where our enemies
expect us to fail. Will we, again,
prove them right? –Ivan Parkins, 3/08 |
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What If
We Had Not Fought? By Ivan
W. Parkins The
great question, answerable only with speculation, but necessary to any well-
founded opinion, is what if we had not gone to war? Opponents of the present and earlier wars
should not be permitted a free assumption that greater peace for mankind and/
or a saving to America of wars’ costs, would have occurred. The enemies that we fight, and have fought,
also played parts in those decisions. As
Churchill said of Britain and France’s abandoning of Czechoslovakia to Hitler at Munich, they were given a
choice between war and dishonor; they chose dishonor and they got war. A very substantial Czech army and the vast
Skoda armament works became Hitler’s at very small cost to him. The issue of whether or not to fight is
often one already made by others, but democratic systems can be slow in
responding. Hitler gained much of his
strength during the period in which decisions of who, when, and where were
his alone to make. In
1950, what would have happened to Japan, then struggling to recover from
World War II, had we not made the effort that we did in Korea? Communists controlled China by then, and
communists were gaining in much of the Third World. A decade later, President Kennedy, only a
few weeks after his state of the nation address made a second such formal
presentation, devoted just to the growing threat. Would Indonesia have been able to forestall the
communist coup in 1965 without our having already intervened in Vietnam? And how would the more than a million
Vietnamese communist troops that we helped to kill have been employed if not
against us?
Indeed, it had been speculated in our mass media at the time of the
1960 elections that S.E. Asia and most
of the Third World would be communist within a few decades. The Soviet Union was countering our nuclear
threat with new missiles, and aiding other communists to take over elsewhere.
Again, what would have happened (IF?) is a matter of speculation. But, for anyone willing to apply real
information and serious thought to it, there is no basis for assuming that
America or mankind would have fared better if the United States had fought
less during the past three quarters of a century. |
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I owe an apology to THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, from which I took the "War on the Cheap"
graph.
I misinterpreted the Journal's attribution to OMB; that was for dates
and GDP figures only. The graph belongs to the Journal. I.W. Parkins |
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©Ivan W. Parkins 2010, All articles, text, web pages property of
Ivan W. Parkins. Use of any material
requires permission of the author
and can be obtained by contacting,
info@americanpoliticalcommentary.com |
