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About
Ivan W. Parkins: Dr.
Parkins is a retired professor of Political Science from Central Michigan
University. He received his PhD from
the University of Chicago and is a graduate of the United States Naval
Academy. Dr. Parkins served as a naval
officer during WWII aboard the battleship Alabama. He is a recent widower with three
daughters, 3 grand children and 2 great grand children. Dr. Parkins has written extensively, having
authored 3 books and a newspaper opinion column for many years. |
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AMERICAN “IMPERIALISM”? Or How Communists used Politics to Trump Military Power By Ivan W. Parkins Most descriptions of
America’s recent foreign wars as being “imperialist” are better indications
of the emotional state of those who make them than they are either
informative or logical accounts of our actions. The basic pattern for
our Cold War effort was George Kennan’s proposed containment of
Soviet/Communist expansion. It was
our, mainly peaceful, response to a very dangerous threat, hence Cold war.
The NATO Treaty was our commitment to defend the democracies of Western
Europe. It was our most explicit, but not our only, such pledge. For
instance, to Southeast Asians we promised less specific support for freedom,
SEATO (South East Asia Treaty
Organization) . But, what did that mean? The Soviets, having
lost nearly 75 times as many people as we did in WWII, were not really anxious
for another blood-letting. However,
aiding communist movements, often in the guise of anti-colonialism or other
self government, was an acceptable alternative. There was Korea. And I remember well, in 1962, buying heavy
plywood, ready to eat foods, and making other preparations of our small home
near Jacksonville for a possible missile strike on that city. Upon entering the
Presidency, John Kennedy had made a second state of the nation address soon
after some warnings in the first. In
it he emphasized the multiple threats from communist movements in the Third
World. He created the Green Berets and
strengthened our small mission in South Vietnam. The Vietnam War
remains, in many respects, a key to understanding domestic dissention
regarding our military role since WWII, at least until 9/11. It is too easy today to forget how severe
the communist threat was in the Third World prior to the Soviet Union’s
collapse. Too easy, also, to forget
that we had a SEATO agreement and John Kennedy’s initiative to guide us. Unfortunately, critics of our Vietnam
effort, powerful in the media, have done little to make such factors parts of
public memory. In 1972, President
Nixon was reelected by the largest popular plurality in American history,
partly because he seemed to be fulfilling his promise to bring the Vietnam
War to an honorable conclusion. And,
in spite of extensive media propaganda to the contrary, he seemed to be doing
just that. Our ground forces were
mostly withdrawn, our financial outlays were declining, and the enemy was
making little if any gain against the South Vietnamese. Then, Congress
halted our air support, cut our financial aide to the South Vietnamese in
half on three successive years (i.e. to one-eighth of what it had been) and
forced President Nixon from office. We were not defeated
in Vietnam! We were defeated in
Washington, New York, and on university campuses. The communists proved one of their favorite
points; politics trumps military power. I.W.Parkins 113008 |
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WARFARE AND THE WEST Politics and
Military Power Part One The following series of articles are my
commentaries over the last forty years regarding the political use of
military power . A key part of America’s culture war has been the attack of
intellectuals upon the military establishment. That attack climaxed in the 1970’s with
Congress’ abandonment of our South Vietnamese allies, and resulted in our
greatest national defeat. With the aid of an increasingly centralized and intellectually
influenced mass media, an articulate minority of Americans was able to reduce
popular support for our military in Vietnam, and in the Cold War. The historical facts that major communist
regimes had killed several times more of the people under their jurisdiction
than they had killed of their foreign enemies did not prevent America’s new
elite from suggesting that we would be better off “Red” than dead. Inconvenient books, i.e. those difficult to
reconcile with the elitist viewpoint (THE NEW AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, AMERICA IN VIETNAM, THE BIG
STORY, AFTER LONG SILENCE, THE HAUNTED WOOD, and
others), often got the silent treatment.
Few journalists, academics, or librarians helped American to discover
them. Regarding statistical facts that have recently come to light,
most Americans remain unaware that Cambodian records of the enemy’s use of
that country, North Vietnamese reports of their own losses in combat with us,
etc. demonstrate that our military erred on the side of caution rather than
of excess in its reports of such figures.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union has come plentiful evidence that
the threat, which it had posed to us, had rarely, if ever, been exaggerated.
I.W. Parkins 2005 |
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FREEDOM’S BATTLE By Ivan W. Parkins I
have borrowed (above) the title of Gary J. Bass’ book; the subtitle is ”The
Origins of Humanitarian Intervention.”
Bass contends “All of the major themes of today’s heated debates about
humanitarian intervention—about sovereignty or supporting universal human
rights. . . or veiled imperialistic motivations—were voiced loud and clear
throughout the nineteenth century.”
And, he cites examples that make much of our recent comment sound old.
Even in the 1800s, Bass says, the press played a large part in public
attention, and the extent or absence of press notice made a major difference
in what atrocities led to great power interferences or remained virtual
secretes. Rulers and their top aides
were often moved by popular protests. One
item that may surprise most readers today is that during the Greek Revolution
(1820s) some Christians, as well as some Muslims, sold their captives into
slavery.
Among things new to me were details of a major and decisive naval
battle, a key to Greek independence that I cannot recall hearing about
previously. Many critics described
Navarino at the time as a massacre, even though the Turkish and Egyptian
forces included more ships, more guns, and more men than the British, French,
and Russian squadrons. Furthermore,
the Ottoman’s had chosen the place of battle.
Throughout, Bass offers a detailed and documented account of personal
roles and events without excessive judgmental comments. His major conclusions are:
“First, humanitarianism and imperialism should not be casually blurred
together.
. . .
“Second, humanitarian intervention is possible even in a world where
U.S. and
European security are not absolutely assured. . . .
“Third, and finally, humanitarian intervention can be part of a wider
grand strategy of free
republics.”
The goal, Bass says “should be the gradual spread of human rights—not
for domination, but for a better kind of self-governance.”
I.W.Parkins 120108 |
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VIET NAM: ESOTERIC VITAL INTERESTS This is a reprint of a Column, in The Ridgerunner, Asheville, North Carolina, 2/14/66 By Ivan W. Parkins Most explanations of the war in Vietnam seem unconvincing. Our Government’s policies there are assailed by spokesmen of both
the Left and the Right. On the Left
are those who cannot believe that the Communists are reluctant to negotiate a
settlement. They seem to doubt that
the Communists have sufficient reason for continuing such a bloody and
awkward struggle. On the right are
those who cannot accept President Johnson’s limitation of the war and his
willingness to see it end on nearly any terms, which will leave South Vietnam
free of communist domination. Why are
the Communists reluctant to settle?
What would we gain from a negotiated peace at this time? I suggest that the answer to these
questions lies not in any obtuseness on the part of either the communist
governments or our own. The answer
lays in the obscure, but vital interest, which major powers have at stake in
Vietnam. Placed in the context of the entire Cold War, and
examined carefully, the struggle in Vietnam becomes meaningful. It is, in fact, a crucial test of what may
be the Communists’ best instrument of power.
Hence, it is also a test of our ability to stem the main force of
communist expansion. It is entirely
possible that this limited war in Vietnam may some day be regarded as the
climactic confrontation of the Cold War. The communist drive for predominance in the world
has been characterized by reliance upon four major instruments of power: the
ability of communism to persuade and subvert, the capacity of the Soviet
Union to arm for a major war, and the development of communist technology are
three instruments which have been carefully tried, and found to be useful,
but inadequate. Only the fourth
instrument remains as a likely source of communist advantage. And it is that fourth instrument which is
being tested in Vietnam. Guerrilla warfare, carried on as part of national
revolutionary movements, provides the chief hope for the communists. It is the means by which most communist
regimes have come to power. It is the
means by which France was humbled in Vietnam and the United States harassed
in Cuba. Even allowing for failures in
the Philippines, Malaya and the Congo, it is not difficult to see why the
Communists would pin their hopes on guerrilla warfare. Communism’s greatest living figure, Mae Tze Tung, is
an authority on guerrilla methods.
Because the methods include a certain ideological outlook, we
“imperialists” cannot adopt them.
Because the methods of fighting hit and run, our conventional forces
cannot defeat them. With a little care
in preparation and timing, guerrilla warfare can be used to defeat us in
nearly every corner of the globe. Such
is the communist belief. And this
belief is what is being tested in Vietnam.
This is why the Communists are so reluctant to negotiate a settlement,
and why we can afford to make one on terms which do nothing more than to
preserve South Vietnam. If communist supported guerrillas should now fail,
on the site of one of their greatest victories, and on the doorstep of China,
who could be persuaded to relay upon communist help again? In a world where the United States had
numerous successful veterans of guerrilla war, on what instrument could
Communists pin their hopes? |
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Letter to the Editor,
Detroit Free Press, 06/29/69, Detroit, Michigan Two key dovish
contentions are difficult to reconcile with the President’s hopeful plan of
withdrawal. The first is that we are
in Vietnam to satisfy some irrational anti-communist tendency, which afflicts
the more provincial of American leaders and public. The second is that
the South Vietnamese consist of Vietcong sympathizers on the one side and
apathetic peasants led by greedy incompetents on the other. From the perspective
of official statements on the purpose and progress of the war, President
Nixon’s hopes of withdrawal seem reasonable.
This presumes that we are in Vietnam to help the South Vietnamese
choose their own future and that the present government of South Vietnam, for
all of its imperfections, is more popular and effective than predecessors and
alternatives. It also suggests
that, militarily, the war is going well for us. The doves, because of
the positions, which they have taken on American motivation and South
Vietnamese competence, cannot conceive of withdrawal unless there is a
coalition government or some other American defeat. An American success,
i.e. withdrawal leaving a viable and friendly regime in South Vietnam, would
seriously damage the intellectual and moral standings of American doves. |
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©Ivan W. Parkins 2009, All articles, text, web pages property of
Ivan W. Parkins. Use of any material
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