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VIET NAM: ESOTERIC VITAL INTERESTS This is a reprint of a Column, in The Ridgerunner, Asheville, North Carolina, 2/14/66 By Ivan W. Parkins Most explanations of the war in Vietnam seem unconvincing. Our Government’s policies there are assailed by spokesmen of both
the Left and the Right. On the Left
are those who cannot believe that the Communists are reluctant to negotiate a
settlement. They seem to doubt that
the Communists have sufficient reason for continuing such a bloody and
awkward struggle. On the right are
those who cannot accept President Johnson’s limitation of the war and his
willingness to see it end on nearly any terms, which will leave South Vietnam
free of communist domination. Why are
the Communists reluctant to settle?
What would we gain from a negotiated peace at this time? I suggest that the answer to these
questions lies not in any obtuseness on the part of either the communist
governments or our own. The answer
lays in the obscure, but vital interest, which major powers have at stake in
Vietnam. Placed in the context of the entire Cold War, and
examined carefully, the struggle in Vietnam becomes meaningful. It is, in fact, a crucial test of what may
be the Communists’ best instrument of power.
Hence, it is also a test of our ability to stem the main force of
communist expansion. It is entirely
possible that this limited war in Vietnam may some day be regarded as the
climactic confrontation of the Cold War. The communist drive for predominance in the world
has been characterized by reliance upon four major instruments of power: the
ability of communism to persuade and subvert, the capacity of the Soviet
Union to arm for a major war, and the development of communist technology are
three instruments which have been carefully tried, and found to be useful,
but inadequate. Only the fourth
instrument remains as a likely source of communist advantage. And it is that fourth instrument which is
being tested in Vietnam. Guerrilla warfare, carried on as part of national
revolutionary movements, provides the chief hope for the communists. It is the means by which most communist
regimes have come to power. It is the
means by which France was humbled in Vietnam and the United States harassed
in Cuba. Even allowing for failures in
the Philippines, Malaya and the Congo, it is not difficult to see why the
Communists would pin their hopes on guerrilla warfare. Communism’s greatest living figure, Mae Tze Tung, is
an authority on guerrilla methods.
Because the methods include a certain ideological outlook, we
“imperialists” cannot adopt them.
Because the methods of fighting hit and run, our conventional forces
cannot defeat them. With a little care
in preparation and timing, guerrilla warfare can be used to defeat us in
nearly every corner of the globe. Such
is the communist belief. And this
belief is what is being tested in Vietnam.
This is why the Communists are so reluctant to negotiate a settlement,
and why we can afford to make one on terms which do nothing more than to
preserve South Vietnam. If communist supported guerrillas should now fail,
on the site of one of their greatest victories, and on the doorstep of China,
who could be persuaded to relay upon communist help again? In a world where the United States had
numerous successful veterans of guerrilla war, on what instrument could
Communists pin their hopes? |
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DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA By Ivan W. Parkins
There is a millenniums old controversy regarding the proper role of
public opinion in government. In the
classical days of Greece it revolved about the likelihood of demagoguery in
the public forum and mob-rule. At
least as recently as the early 1930s, it was very evident in Germany. One great change is the rise of mass media
and nearly instantaneous communication.
Clearly, modern media make information available to much larger
publics. To what extent do they also
present dangers similar to those of ancient demagoguery?
Representative democracy, i.e. public opinion reflected in policy
making, mainly, through Congress was the answer of our nation’s
founders. But, have not our media
become the chief conduits of opinions—often not either public or
official? That is what I believe that
I see today. Our
Constitution (First Amendment) promises “the press” immunity from
congressional interference. But, the
mass media of today are much more centralized and pervasive than that of the
late 1700s. Furthermore, the
institution that then seemed most likely to rival government was religion,
and the Constitution limits its role.
Today, our communications technologies enable minorities of any stripe
and hue to organize nationally and pressure government directly. Meanwhile, our Representatives have very
little direct knowledge of how most of their constituents fare from day to
day.
Even after allowing that the legal rules of who can participate and
how are more generous today than ever before, is our political system really
more democratic, or is it less so? |
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WHY DO WE HAVE OIL CRISES? By Ivan W. Parkins The
recent radical changes in the price of oil should make us consider questions
that may be more import than the oil situation. How much of recent turmoil resulted from geology,
production, and consumption and how much was due to opinion and political
problems? It is not a question with
one black and white answer, but the shades of grey can vary greatly.
Robin M. Mills has a Master’s Degree in geology; he had been employed
by Shell Oil, and is since Petroleum Economics Manager for the Emirates of
Dubai. His book, THE MYTH OF THE OIL
CRISIS, 2008, is formidable reading for an amateur like myself, full of
technical details and references. But,
he does answer some popular arguments clearly and with apparent factual
authority. One
popular argument is that the “easy” oil is gone. Mills contends that that idea is based
largely upon a neglect of history and the related politics. Colonel Drake’s first well, in 1859, was
difficult and dangerous for the technology of that time; D’Arcy’s 1908
discovery of oil in the Middle East was also a formidable undertaking. Today, what seems likely to be the easiest
oil is not being developed mainly because of political bans.
Another argument of those who want rapid change to other fuels is that
the energy needed to produce oil from sources such as Canada’s tar-sands or
from shale is so great as to make those sources uneconomic—EROEI (energy
return on energy invested). That is a
reasonable off-the-top-of-the-head argument, but it ignores the facts. Shell
computes its EROEI from shale at 3-5.5%.
Mills says that the ratio is even more favorable for nuclear and coal
alternatives. He
ridicules the idea of complete energy independence, citing North Korea and
Myanmar as current examples, and very poor.
Expertise is to be regarded with a liberal portion of salt. Mills quotes 1928 Nobel in physics winner
Robert Millikan on the nuclear energy idea as a “utopian dream” and as
“childish”. Mills regards nuclear
fusion as feasible within the lifetimes of persons now living. Is
our oil crisis mostly an oil problem, or is it mostly an opinion and
political problem? 121508 I.W.Parkins |
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THE RESCUE OF OUR AUTO MAKERS By Ivan W. Parkins What pleases me most
about the planned rescue of our auto makers is that both the President and
the President-Elect favor it. Greater
unity in national leadership may be more important than the precise terms of
any plan. The crisis of recent
months has, in my opinion, been more of a panic than an economic crisis. We remain very rich, but not well
organized. In that, this does resemble
the early 1930s. Then, FDR became a
popular hero chiefly because he rescued us from the panic that destroyed
several less mature democracies. His
economic measures were makeshifts, but what he did in advancement of national
leadership and organization became a major blessing for us and for the free
world during WWII. It also made possible much of the post-war social
progress. How our auto industry
will ultimately fare is problematic.
In the past, both railroads and steel have declined greatly after new
competition made older business methods, especially labor practices,
unprofitable. Let us hope that those
lessons are now applied. |
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WESTERN DOMINATION Column, Daily
Times-News, 12/13/69, Mt. Pleasant, MI By Ivan W. Parkins How
adequate is the technological explanation of Western power and influence in
the world? The rise of the West,
beginning in the fifteenth century and ending (apparently) in the first half
of this century, is often attributed to military and industrial
technology. That interpretation has
now become the basis for charges that the West, especially the United States,
is to technologically oriented, too lacking in humanity, to be fit for
leadership. It appears, however, that
the technological explanation of Western dominion and the charges following
from it rest chiefly upon the illusory perspective of looking backward. Five
centuries ago, when Portugal and Spain began the explorations and conquests,
which led to Western domination of the globe, Westerners held little, if any,
technological advantage over the Arabs and the Oriental peoples. In fact, Westerners were indebted to Arabs
and Orientals for a very large part of their technology. The rapid technological advance of the
West, which is so much emphasized in our histories, did not produce a great
margin of advantage until the nineteenth century. Clive,
at Plassey, in 1754, faced an Indian army which not only outnumbered the
British and native allies, but which also had more and heavier
artillery. Again and again in the
colonial wars (at Fallen Timbers; in the Opium War, in the Philippines)
Western armies relied heavily upon the bayonet. It was not a few dozen muskets and suits of
armor, which enabled a handful of conquistadors to take Mexico and Peru. The advantage lay in the quality of Western
political direction and discipline. Mention
of the Opium War suggests another aspect of the problem. The opium trade was promoted by Westerners,
because of the difficulty of producing other commodities with which to pay
for the products of the Orient. Until
late in the nineteenth century the West had few surpluses of manufactured
goods and the East showed little desire for what the West did produce. The
growth of Western power and influence are much more easily and adequately
explained by such nonmaterial factors as nationalism and economic enterprise
than by technology and material wealth.
Technological advantage and material wealth have resulted from the
superior development and utilization of human resources made possible by
Western politics and economics. The
best argument for inverting the technological explanation of Western
political and economic dominance is contemporary. Recently, we have witnessed the emergence
of Asian and African peoples as they acquired substantial knowledge of
Western politics and economics. The
material and technological gaps between ourselves and those peoples are
probably wider now than they have ever been in the past, yet former Western
colonies and protectorates continue to gain independence. It
is chiefly by an unhistorical projection into the past of our present
technological pre-eminence that we are tempted to attribute the rise of the
West to military and industrial technology.
Many of us have allowed our perspectives to be limited by contemporary
technology. But few of us have erred
so egregiously or premised such a heavy burden of conclusions upon the error,
as do those who now denounce, as merely technological, the heritage and
achievements of the West. |
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©Ivan W. Parkins 2009, All articles, text, web pages property of
Ivan W. Parkins. Use of any material
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