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Ivan Parkins |
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©Ivan W. Parkins 2008, All articles, text, web pages property of
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About
Ivan W. Parkins: Dr.
Parkins is a retired professor of Political Science from Central Michigan
University. He received his PhD from
the University of Chicago and is a graduate of the United States Naval
Academy. Dr. Parkins served as a naval
officer during WWII aboard the battleship Alabama. He is a recent widower with three
daughters, 3 grand children and 2 great grand children. Dr. Parkins has written extensively, having
authored 3 books and a newspaper opinion column for many years. |
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Front Page
Archive 2008
Archive2009 Page
2, Disassemble the House Page
3, RE-RUNS Page
4, More RE-RUNS Page
5, Book Reviews# |
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The America that I have known will one day be remembered for its military
achievements, especially for how effectively we managed costs to ourselves. World War II was, in many respects, the greatest and most costly in world
history. America entered late,
suffered over 400,000 fatalities, spent almost 40% of its gross product for
three years, and emerged one of the victors.
We were then able to nourish the recovery of many other combatants,
both allies and enemies. Because we
entered the war from depressed economic conditions, much of the economic cost
was absorbed by the full employment of recently-idle labor and industrial
capacities. A decade later, America again was at war, in Korea. That cost us nearly 40,000 lives, and at
the peak, 13% of our gross product. It
prevented a totalitarian conquest of South Korea, a nation now free, friendly
and prosperous. In Vietnam, after expending over 50,000 lives and product at a rate that
approached 10%, we withdrew. That
choice was a political one, not a military defeat. There, the subsequent cost in lives to our
former allies was more horrendous than anything that we ourselves have
suffered. The high cost to America’s
political unity and social order is still evident. For most of the last half of the twentieth century we were engaged in a
cold war with the Soviet Union. Except
that the wars in both Korea and Vietnam were related to our contest with the
Soviets, the cold war was nearly fatality free. It did, however, require us to maintain
high military outlays. We prospered in
spite of those expenditures; the Soviets were unable to keep pace and their system
collapsed. Now, we are at war with radical Islamists. They declared it; they attacked us at home;
they vow to destroy us. Our military
costs, in lives and in treasure, are moderate when compared to those during
most of my lifetime. Our response
remains incomplete. |
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The graph to the right , by the Office of
Management and Budget, demonstrates that in the 1990’s a very large part of
the Clinton Administration’s savings came from national defense. Those savings have made the war in Iraq
more expensive than it might have been had an earlier level of military, and
intelligence, spending been maintained. If you look at similar graphs for the period of the Vietnam War, you will
find that, at it’s most expensive around Tet, 1968, military spending rose
only slightly above the previous decade of Cold War spending. Much of
national defense costs are for maintaining, training,
and improving the readiness capabilities of our forces, whether at home in
peace or abroad in some limited conflict.
Especially, in the earlier battles of WWII we paid in extra lives for
our lack of readiness. The old saying
that, “if you want peace, you should prepare for war” has merit. The Swiss and Swedes have done well at it,
but only recently. During WWII our
Navy relied heavily upon the 20mm and 40mm machineguns of Swiss Oilercon and
Swedish Bofors armament companies. Both
the Swiss and Swedes had violent histories in earlier centuries; both
maintained high states of preparedness; and both avoided active involvement
in WWII. The United States is
far too large a player in the world to expect such easy choices. I owe an
apology to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, from which I took the
"War on the Cheap" graph. I misinterpreted the Journal's attribution to OMB; that
was for dates and GDP figures only. The graph belongs to the
Journal. I.W. Parkins |
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And the WALL STREET JOURNAL |
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Reading History, FOR LIBERTY AND GLORY One joy of reading history is
noting the parallels of past and present politics. In James R. Gaines'
FOR LIBERTY AND GLORY, I've just encountered how Lafayette, 225 years
ago, sought to convince his king that freer trade laws vis-à-vis America
would benefit France. If that reminds you of some things now being said
by President Bush, please keep in mind that the response of Louis XVI's
ministers was about as "progressive" as that of present day
Democrats. |
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WARS AND THEIR COSTS |
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Admiral Fallon, History Repeats Itself The recent retirement of Admiral Fallon from Central Command, apparently
over disagreement with the Administration’s policy, is entirely consistent
with the American tradition that the military serves under civilian
leadership in pursuing matters of national interest and strategy. It was the essential basis of President
Truman’s firing of General MacArthur.
Unfortunately, that principle is not as clear or simple as it sounds. Our Vietnam experience should have helped us to clarify such matter; it
only demonstrated for future enemies our greatest vulnerability. Shortly after that war, I had a brief exchange with Colonel Harry
Summers on that matter. CLEARER NATIONAL POLICY NEEDED column, The Morning Sun, 10/19/83 by Ivan Parkins “On Strategy: A
Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,” by Col. Harry G. Summers Jr. is used
as a text at the Army War College and in other officer training
programs. It is a sober piece of
military scholarship, built around the thesis that strategy begins with a
clear and attainable military objective and that such an objective must be
derived from national policy. Col. Summers regards the making of national policy as
civilian function. He contends that in
Vietnam our national policy was unclear and so was our military objective. What Col. Summers calls for is consistent with both classical
military theory and the American constitutional system. Our Army’s leaders should consult with
civilian makers of national policy and recommend strategies. It is up to Army leadership to say what
objectives the Army is capable of attaining and at what probable cost. “Nation Building,” as in Vietnam, does not qualify as a clear
and attainable military objective. Lyndon Johnson bears the brunt of Col. Summers’ criticism-for
our uncertain policy, especially for not invoking the will of the American
people in support of the Vietnam effort.
Apparently, Col. Summers believes that a formal declaration of war
would have forestalled most of our problems there. The chief weakness of both the book and our actual strategy
in Vietnam is one imposed by our constitutional tradition. Our military leaders are obliged to accept
policies which the American political system, especially the President,
define for them. Is the American political system capable of doing what it
failed to do in Vietnam; can it actually choose and maintain, a clear
policy? It is easy to sympathize with
Col. Summers’ view that, in Vietnam, the Army was let down by its commander in chief. However, I doubt that military demands for
a more clearly defined policy, as a basis for strategy, could have
contributed much more to American success in Vietnam. What Army demands for clearer national policies, might have
been achieved during the Vietnam War,
and they may yet achieve in the future.
They may sharpen constitutional conflict at home. And a domestic showdown over how American
policy is made and sustained, may be overdue. On one hand, after noting that the mass media were a source
of much embarrassment to efforts of our military in Vietnam, Col. Summers
says (p39), “censorship is not the answer.”
He then observes that it is difficult to reconcile the realities of
the battlefield with American idealism. On the other hand, Col. Summers concurs in the traditional
theory that national will is a vital constituent of national strength. How can America be strong if its media does
not help to rationalize its policies, i.e. to relate its ideals to realities
of this world? The central fact of American politics and policy regarding
Vietnam was that an influential minority of Americans set out (most of them
not until after the nation was committed) to discredit and disrupt our war
effort. They included many leading
academics and journalists, and their views dominated the national media. Confusion regarding the nature of our involvement did not
originate in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
As Sen. Fulbright acknowledged, in answer to Sen. Cooper during
debate, that document authorized the president to lead us into war. Only two Senators, and no Representative,
voted against it. We were defeated in Vietnam, because we lacked a clear policy and
the national will to pursue it. We
lacked these because so many of the instruments of opinion formation,
especially our institutions of higher education and mass communication, were
employed, not to help clarify policy and strengthen will, but to destroy them
both. The increased size, autonomy and influence of higher
education and mass communication constitute the most fundamental change in
the American political system during this century. Neither our constitutional tradition nor
Col. Summers book explains how change of such magnitude can be accommodated. So far, the presidency of the United States has been the
principal bulwark of traditional and popular leadership. Congress, when blitzed by the media, has
shown little sense of its responsibility to either the most recent election
results or to its own previous commitments.
Of that, Vietnam remains a prime example. Much as Col. Summers and the Army may wish to accept the
American tradition and to ask only what policies they should help execute,
they cannot really avoid the growing dilemma of American politics. Indeed, the Army must ask the political system for a clear
statement of policy before it fights.
But, should it ask only the president, or the president and
Congress, or must it now consult the mass media, too? If a prompt and substantial agreement among
all of those is not forthcoming, or if, as in Vietnam, the agreement
collapses, should our Army fight? Now, one point has been made clear by the terrorists; they mean to
destroy us. Avoiding a fight is not one of our
options. The remaining issues are
reduced to when, where, and by what means.
Our military is adapting well to enemy challenges. Our political system is where our enemies
expect us to fail. Will we, again,
prove them right? –Ivan Parkins, 3/08 |