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Ivan W.
Parkins |
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©Ivan W. Parkins 2008, All articles, text, web pages property of
Ivan W. Parkins. Use of any material
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About
Ivan W. Parkins: Dr.
Parkins is a retired professor of Political Science from Central Michigan
University. He received his PhD from
the University of Chicago and is a graduate of the United States Naval
Academy. Dr. Parkins served as a naval
officer during WWII aboard the battleship Alabama. He is a recent widower with three
daughters, 3 grand children and 2 great grand children. Dr. Parkins has written extensively, having
authored 3 books and a newspaper opinion column for many years. |
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Front Page |
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VIET NAM: ESOTERIC VITAL INTERESTS This is a reprint of a Column, in The Ridgerunner, Asheville, North Carolina, 2/14/66 By Ivan W. Parkins Most explanations of the war in Vietnam seem unconvincing. Our Government’s policies there are assailed by spokesmen of both
the Left and the Right. On the Left
are those who cannot believe that the Communists are reluctant to negotiate a
settlement. They seem to doubt that
the Communists have sufficient reason for continuing such a bloody and
awkward struggle. On the right are
those who cannot accept President Johnson’s limitation of the war and his
willingness to see it end on nearly any terms, which will leave South Vietnam
free of communist domination. Why are
the Communists reluctant to settle?
What would we gain from a negotiated peace at this time? I suggest that the answer to these
questions lies not in any obtuseness on the part of either the communist
governments or our own. The answer
lays in the obscure, but vital interest, which major powers have at stake in
Vietnam. Placed in the context of the entire Cold War, and
examined carefully, the struggle in Vietnam becomes meaningful. It is, in fact, a crucial test of what may
be the Communists’ best instrument of power.
Hence, it is also a test of our ability to stem the main force of
communist expansion. It is entirely
possible that this limited war in Vietnam may some day be regarded as the
climactic confrontation of the Cold War. The communist drive for predominance in the world
has been characterized by reliance upon four major instruments of power: the
ability of communism to persuade and subvert, the capacity of the Soviet
Union to arm for a major war, and the development of communist technology are
three instruments which have been carefully tried, and found to be useful,
but inadequate. Only the fourth
instrument remains as a likely source of communist advantage. And it is that fourth instrument which is
being tested in Vietnam. Guerrilla warfare, carried on as part of national
revolutionary movements, provides the chief hope for the communists. It is the means by which most communist
regimes have come to power. It is the
means by which France was humbled in Vietnam and the United States harassed
in Cuba. Even allowing for failures in
the Philippines, Malaya and the Congo, it is not difficult to see why the
Communists would pin their hopes on guerrilla warfare. Communism’s greatest living figure, Mae Tze Tung, is
an authority on guerrilla methods.
Because the methods include a certain ideological outlook, we
“imperialists” cannot adopt them.
Because the methods of fighting hit and run, our conventional forces
cannot defeat them. With a little care
in preparation and timing, guerrilla warfare can be used to defeat us in
nearly every corner of the globe. Such
is the communist belief. And this
belief is what is being tested in Vietnam.
This is why the Communists are so reluctant to negotiate a settlement,
and why we can afford to make one on terms which do nothing more than to
preserve South Vietnam. If communist supported guerrillas should now fail,
on the site of one of their greatest victories, and on the doorstep of China,
who could be persuaded to relay upon communist help again? In a world where the United States had
numerous successful veterans of guerrilla war, on what instrument could
Communists pin their hopes? |
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Inside This Issue Disassemble
the House The
Political Long View Media
Bias Book
Reviews War
and Their Costs Broken
Congress Dividing
America Dividing
America, Part two Disinformation,
Liberal Ideology The
Supreme Court and Judiciary Environmentalism
The
Presidency, Part One The
Presidency, Part Two Failure
of the People’s House The
Republic in Danger The
2008 Election, Part One The
2008 Election, The Aftermath |
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DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA By Ivan W. Parkins There is a millenniums old controversy
regarding the proper role of public opinion in government. In the classical days of Greece it revolved
about the likelihood of demagoguery in the public forum and mob-rule. At least as recently as the early 1930s, it
was very evident in Germany. One great
change is the rise of mass media and nearly instantaneous communication. Clearly, modern media make information
available to much larger publics. To
what extent do they also present dangers similar to those of ancient
demagoguery? Representative democracy, i.e. public
opinion reflected in policy making, mainly, through Congress was the answer
of our nation’s founders. But, have
not our media become the chief conduits of opinions—often not either public
or official? That is what I believe
that I see today. Our Constitution (First Amendment)
promises “the press” immunity from congressional interference. But, the mass media of today are much more
centralized and pervasive than that of the late 1700s. Furthermore, the institution that then
seemed most likely to rival government was religion, and the Constitution
limits its role. Today, our communications technologies
enable minorities of any stripe and hue to organize nationally and pressure
government directly. Meanwhile, our
Representatives have very little direct knowledge of how most of their
constituents fare from day to day. Even after allowing that the legal rules
of who can participate and how are more generous today than ever before, is
our political system really more democratic, or is it less so? |
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WHY DO WE HAVE OIL CRISES? By Ivan W. Parkins The recent radical changes in the price
of oil should make us consider questions that may be more import than the oil
situation. How much of recent turmoil
resulted from geology, production, and consumption and how much was due to
opinion and political problems? It is
not a question with one black and white answer, but the shades of grey can
vary greatly. Robin M. Mills has a Master’s Degree in
geology; he had been employed by Shell Oil, and is since Petroleum Economics
Manager for the Emirates of Dubai. His
book, THE MYTH OF THE OIL CRISIS, 2008, is formidable reading for an amateur
like myself, full of technical details and references. But, he does answer some popular arguments
clearly and with apparent factual authority. One popular argument is that the “easy”
oil is gone. Mills contends that that
idea is based largely upon a neglect of history and the related politics. Colonel Drake’s first well, in 1859, was
difficult and dangerous for the technology of that time; D’Arcy’s 1908
discovery of oil in the Middle East was also a formidable undertaking. Today, what seems likely to be the easiest
oil is not being developed mainly because of political bans. Another argument of those who want rapid
change to other fuels is that the energy needed to produce oil from sources
such as Canada’s tar-sands or from shale is so great as to make those sources
uneconomic—EROEI (energy return on energy invested). That is a reasonable
off-the-top-of-the-head argument, but it ignores the facts. Shell computes
its EROEI from shale at 3-5.5%. Mills
says that the ratio is even more favorable for nuclear and coal alternatives. He ridicules the idea of complete energy
independence, citing North Korea and Myanmar as current examples, and very
poor. Expertise is to be regarded with
a liberal portion of salt. Mills
quotes 1928 Nobel in physics winner Robert Millikan on the nuclear energy
idea as a “utopian dream” and as “childish”.
Mills regards nuclear fusion as feasible within the lifetimes of
persons now living. Is our oil crisis mostly an oil
problem, or is it mostly an opinion and political problem?
121508 I.W.Parkins |
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THE RESCUE OF OUR AUTO MAKERS By Ivan W. Parkins What pleases me most about the planned
rescue of our auto makers is that both the President and the President-Elect
favor it. Greater unity in national
leadership may be more important than the precise terms of any plan. The crisis of recent months has, in my
opinion, been more of a panic than an economic crisis. We remain very rich, but not well
organized. In that, this does resemble
the early 1930s. Then, FDR became a
popular hero chiefly because he rescued us from the panic that destroyed
several less mature democracies. His
economic measures were makeshifts, but what he did in advancement of national
leadership and organization became a major blessing for us and for the free
world during WWII. It also made possible much of the post-war social
progress. How our auto industry will ultimately
fare is problematic. In the past, both
railroads and steel have declined greatly after new competition made older
business methods, especially labor practices, unprofitable. Let us hope that those lessons are now
applied. |
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WESTERN DOMINATION Column, Daily
Times-News, 12/13/69, Mt. Pleasant, MI By Ivan W. Parkins How adequate is the technological
explanation of Western power and influence in the world? The rise of the West, beginning in the
fifteenth century and ending (apparently) in the first half of this century,
is often attributed to military and industrial technology. That interpretation has now become the
basis for charges that the West, especially the United States, is to
technologically oriented, too lacking in humanity, to be fit for
leadership. It appears, however, that
the technological explanation of Western dominion and the charges following
from it rest chiefly upon the illusory perspective of looking backward. Five centuries ago, when Portugal and
Spain began the explorations and conquests, which led to Western domination
of the globe, Westerners held little, if any, technological advantage over
the Arabs and the Oriental peoples. In
fact, Westerners were indebted to Arabs and Orientals for a very large part
of their technology. The rapid
technological advance of the West, which is so much emphasized in our
histories, did not produce a great margin of advantage until the nineteenth
century. Clive, at Plassey, in 1754, faced an
Indian army which not only outnumbered the British and native allies, but
which also had more and heavier artillery.
Again and again in the colonial wars (at Fallen Timbers; in the Opium
War, in the Philippines) Western armies relied heavily upon the bayonet. It was not a few dozen muskets and suits of
armor, which enabled a handful of conquistadors to take Mexico and Peru. The advantage lay in the quality of Western
political direction and discipline. Mention of the Opium War suggests
another aspect of the problem. The
opium trade was promoted by Westerners, because of the difficulty of
producing other commodities with which to pay for the products of the Orient. Until late in the nineteenth century the
West had few surpluses of manufactured goods and the East showed little
desire for what the West did produce. The growth of Western power and
influence are much more easily and adequately explained by such nonmaterial
factors as nationalism and economic enterprise than by technology and
material wealth. Technological advantage
and material wealth have resulted from the superior development and
utilization of human resources made possible by Western politics and
economics. The best argument for inverting the
technological explanation of Western political and economic dominance is
contemporary. Recently, we have
witnessed the emergence of Asian and African peoples as they acquired substantial
knowledge of Western politics and economics.
The material and technological gaps between ourselves and those
peoples are probably wider now than they have ever been in the past, yet
former Western colonies and protectorates continue to gain independence. It is chiefly by an unhistorical
projection into the past of our present technological pre-eminence that we
are tempted to attribute the rise of the West to military and industrial
technology. Many of us have allowed
our perspectives to be limited by contemporary technology. But few of us have erred so egregiously or
premised such a heavy burden of conclusions upon the error, as do those who
now denounce, as merely technological, the heritage and achievements of the
West. |