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Ivan W.
Parkins |
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©Ivan W. Parkins 2009, All articles, text, web pages property of
Ivan W. Parkins. Use of any material
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About Ivan W. Parkins: Dr. Parkins is a retired professor of
Political Science from Central Michigan University. He received his PhD from the University of
Chicago and is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy. Dr. Parkins served as a naval officer
during WWII aboard the battleship Alabama.
He is a recent widower with three daughters, 3 grand children and 2
great grand children. Dr. Parkins has
written extensively, having authored 3 books and a newspaper opinion column
for many years. |
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Front Page |
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In This Issue: -CRONKITE, THE MEDIA …….. A look
at past media manipulation which
affected U.S. and World politics -SPIES, COMMUNISM AND
ESPIONAGE
The relationship of the intellectual elite in efforts to destroy our
country. The
espionage story of Michael Straight. -NOTES AND COMMENTS ON BOOKS A brief
recollection of Lincoln Steffens. |
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CRONKITE, THE MEDIA AND THE INTELLECTUAL ELITE By Ivan W. Parkins Freedom, prosperity, and, especially, a
government that will foster them, are not things that one large society can
confer upon another. They must be
valued and diligently supported and protected by those who are to enjoy
them. But, how much of our problem
with the politics of our international clients originates with them, and how
much of it here? That is the
question. The following article illustrates this and was originally published, 10/13/71. THIEU’S ELECTION By Ivan W. Parkins
The reelection of President Thieu in South Vietnam ought to provide an
occasion for American rejoicing. The
fact that it has not reflects, in some degree, American sensitivity to
shortcomings of South Vietnamese democracy.
But, who is offering evidence that Thieu is less a democrat than other
leaders of new governments in war-torn countries? Is he less a democrat than any of his
principal predecessors or opponents, less than Diem, Minh, of Ky? How much of American discouragement over
Thieu’s reelection reflects, not shortcomings of Vietnamese politics, but
failures of our own?
American distrust of South Vietnamese leaders did not begin with
President Thieu. A decade ago,
President Diem was under bitter attack in the American press. Diem, like Thieu, was faced with trying to
lead a country made up of fragmented social and religious groups, and plagued
with terrorism encouraged from outside.
Diem’s considerable achievements in education and economic production
were little noticed in the United States.
His sometimes repressive efforts to maintain his government were the
principal subjects of comment here.
Diem was overthrown and killed.
President Kennedy extended American aide to South Vietnam while Diem
was President there. But, even
Presidents of the United States may have difficulty in getting their views to
the public. An exchange of letters
published in the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE early this year disclosed that CBS
had, in effect, censored comments of J.F.K. regarding President Diem. The
charge, raised by John Roche (an aide) and answered by
Walter Cronkite, was substantiated by Pierre Salinger who wrote (3/14/71: ”In
the actual interview, which was filmed, President Kennedy spoke of his
respect and sympathy for the problems of President Diem. When the film was shown to the public, only
the unfavorable Presidential remarks remained, and J.F.K.’s praise of Diem had been deleted.”
Former Press Aide Salinger added that he did not think the distortion
of the President’s views when CBS cut the interview represented deliberate
intent on the part of Mr. Cronkite, and that other matters kept the White
House from offering a correction.
Cronkite contended that the comments cut out were not very significant
and that TV is under no obligation to clear its editorial judgments with
those whom it quotes. {Even the President of the United States?} Our
press, while defending its own “rights” and attacking presidential
credibility, is not always careful to report the obvious and pertinent facts.
We have all listened to several years of charges that President Johnson had
no legal authority to involve us in war in Southeast Asia. In a recent article, Senator Goldwater
recalled that the sponsor of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Senator
Fulbright, had responded to that specific question during Senate debate. I checked the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and
found the following, August 6, 1964, at page 18409.
“Mr. Cooper. Then, looking
ahead, if the President decided that it was necessary to use such force as
could lead into war, we will give that authority by this resolution?
“Mr. Fulbright. That is the way I would interpret it.”
Only two Senators and no members of the House voted against the
resolution. If
one believes that it is in the American interest to leave a viable South
Vietnamese government behind as we withdraw from the war, President Thieu’s
reelection should be encouraging. In
spite of having won only 34% of the vote in his first (11 man) race, and in
spite of bitter criticism that he was a minority President, he managed to
govern the country for a full term.
Now, his efforts to be a majority President have been rewarded by a
very large vote—and increasingly bitter criticism. Even if we accept most of the charges that
Thieu rigged the election (and few of those charges come from unbiased
sources), at least Thieu appears to be more firmly in control than
before. His control should facilitate
our withdrawal—unhumiliated, except for the calumny which some American
opinion leaders heap upon our entire Vietnam effort. We
should discount the current despair over Thieu’s “dictatorship” to at least
the same degree as in necessary to reconcile the contemporary governments of
West Germany, Italy, and Japan with predictions of twenty years ago, when
numerous journalists and academics were charging that our occupations of
those countries were resulting in the restoration of fascism there. It might also pay to look at Iran and
Korea, other “victims” of American imperialism. As
an indication of President Thieu’s fitness to govern South Vietnam, most of
the criticism aimed at him is of trivial significance. As a means of stampeding the American
public, and Senate, into some rash undercutting of Thieu, the criticism may
be significant—similar denunciations helped to destroy Diem. |
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COMMUNISM AND ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES NOTE: In Book Reviews, page 5, I reproduced an old column regarding Michael Straight, and
his very interesting associations with the highest levels of both Communist
spies and American politicians. It has
since become clear that Mr. Straight’s story of having broken with communism
was a ruse, suggested to him, in detail, by his Communist superiors. For more on Michael
Straight see SPIES pages 245-252; also see Michael Straight in Wikipedia. By Ivan W. Parkins A
few months ago I mentioned a new book, SPIES, based upon extensive notes
taken by Alexander Vassiliev, a former officer of the KGB, from archives in
which he worked. The following is a
summary of a few of the most interesting disclosures. The book’s sub-title is “The Rise and
Fall of the KGB;” it is more limited than that, besides rarely mentioning
other Soviet espionage such as that of the military’s GRU, it covers only the
1930s and 1940s. It was the GRU that
employed Alger Hiss. The agencies
discouraged most fraternization as a security measure. Thus, when Michael Straight became an agent
at our State Department and was asked for names of likely recruits, he named
Alger Hiss and Larry Duggan and was warned away. They were both agents already. [Years later, it would be a
fraternization error that sent Alger Hiss to prison—for perjury in denying
that he had known Whitaker Chambers.
With his many top level government admirers, Hiss had been able to
beat earlier and more serious charges.
But Senator Nixon’s investigation, questioning him casually about his
interest in birds, led him to disclose that he had seen a rare wild bird at a
particular place and time. The place
and time corresponded to those of a picnic shared by their two families, and
to Chambers’ mention of the same bird.] The KGB, in 1941 listed its agents in
America by occupation: 49 engineers, 22 journalists, 8 professors, and 4
economists. One journalist source was
Mary Price. She, for two years, was
the secretary of Walter Lippmann; he was probably foremost in the field of
diplomatic and military affairs, hence in close touch with numerous top
officials. The code word for the atomic bomb project
was “Enormous.” It was especially
appropriate for an undertaking that several major powers were contemplating,
but were restrained largely by the huge cost in money, electric power, and
engineering skills that initial attempts would require. Soon after FDR initiated the Manhattan
Project Julius Rosenberg scored his first big prize, one not even identified
until some of Vassiliev’s notes became available. Earl McNutt, an engineer for a N.Y.
architectural firm, gave Rosenberg a set of plans for the initial Oak Ridge
facility. Afterwards, McNutt changed
employers, brushed off further KGB requests, became, and retired as, chief
engineer of a major oil company. When
finally identified, in his old age, he brushed off inquiries and soon died. It is interesting how many of the spies
identified in this book were little punished, if at all. Our laws, at first,
were lax, if any existed. Industrial
espionage became, clearly, a federal crime only in 1996. [From other sources, I know of a former
embassy code clerk who sued successfully an America news magazine for
accusing him of having been convicted of spying against America. It occurred
before Pearl Harbor. He was giving the
Germans secret messages passed between FDR and Churchill. Since we had no
clear law regarding such an offense, Ambassador Kennedy turned him over to
Britain and he was imprisoned for spying against them.] In 1948 things at Arlington Hall, our
code breaking center, “went dark.”
William Weisband, employed there, had informed the Soviets of our
success. One result was that during
our “blindness” Stalin was able to prepare North Korea for the strike
southward, a surprise to us. Mr.
Weisband, got one year in jail on a technicality. Our intelligence people
were afraid that evidence required by legal procedures of a full trial would
harm us more than the spy’s freedom. Our laws are now tougher. But as SPIES makes clear, people of the far
left, such as Michael Straight, are often, if not spies themselves, very
helpful to those who are. The final conclusion of SPIES is; “It
was no witch hunt that led American counterintelligence officials to
investigate government employees and others with access to sensitive
information for Communist ties…they only knew the half of it.” |
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Notes
and Comments; RECENT BOOKS AND MEMORIES OF BOOKS By Ivan W. Parkins
Books can provide a person with some perspectives not readily
available from the more technologically advanced media, For instance SPIES, by John Earl
Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev and published by Yale U.
P. SPIES is mainly the product of
extensive notes smuggled from KGB archives by Vassiliev, a former officer who
worked there. It is tedious reading,
but contains many new and interesting details. An example: Moscow Center sent to Valentin Markin,
chief of its newly created station in this country, the following explanation
of why he was here: “In the system of states, the USA is the
deciding factor in questions of world politics.” The year was 1934, see page
196.
Early in our marriage, before we had television, my wife and I read
books to one another in the evenings.
I rely upon my memory rather than any copy at hand for this summary
from a chapter in THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN STEFFENS. Steffens, perhaps the most famous of the
journalists who President Theodore Roosevelt labeled “Muckrakers” was
visiting the recently elected mayor of Philadelphia. Why?, he asked the mayor, were so many
crooked deals being pushed at the same time; did he not hope to be
reelected? The mayor replied that it
was all part of an agreement with the local party machine. He would crowd as much “business” as he
could into one term. The press and the
public would be unable to keep up and to organize effective
interference. And reelection was not
part of the plan.
Now, I sometimes wonder if our President has read Lincoln Steffens. Reprint 07/22/09 |